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Abstract 
In recent years, establishing successful collaborative arrangements and relationships 
between university, industry and public institutions has come to be seen as essential in 
transforming new scientific knowledge into new innovations and business ventures. The 
fit between these very different actor groups has been treated as a contingent factor. 
However, little attention has been given to the managerial efforts that entrepreneurs 
have make to establish the fit between small firms, university research, and public 
policies such as regulatory policies and R&D policies through network-type structures. 
New biotechnology organizations are perfect objects to study these relationships 
because new biotechnologies and techniques predominantly come from the university 
sector (Kenney, 1986; Yoxen; 1984; Zucker & Darby, 1997; Robbins-Roth, 2001). 
From the perspective of the small biotechnology firms (SBFs,) this paper analyzes four 
different managerial strategies of how to create network structures to deal with the 
interfaces between industry, university and public institutions. The research-oriented 
strategy, the incubator strategy, the industrial-partnering strategy, and the policy-
oriented strategy. The research-oriented strategy focuses narrowly on how 
biotechnology firms transform scientific results into solid business plan or business 
models revealing the aim of the technologies, services or products. The incubator 
strategy is concerned with localization and how to overcome specific types of 
managerial problems in the initial stage of forming a business venture. The industrial-
partnering strategy is concerned with how to overcome the problem of bringing the 
technologies from an experimental stage at a research lab to be able to handle industrial 
processes and full-scale production. Last, but not least, the policy-oriented strategy 
focuses on the problem of having products approved by the public authorities. The aim 
of the article is to demonstrate how SBFs over time develop network structures through 
patchwork-like activities, ongoing and overlapping activities, that serve as a blueprint 
for the management 
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2. The patchwork metaphor 
 
This paper draws upon ten years of investigation into how strategies are developed in small 
biotechnology firms (SBFs). It has become a popular notion, almost a dogma, when speaking of the 
biotechnology industry that the industry has been spun off in university labs (Kenney, 1986; Zucker 
& Darby, 1996), nurtured by the science park incubators (Luger & Goldstein, 1991), fuelled by 
venture capitalists (Norus, 2002), cooled down by public regulation, and marketed by the big 
pharmaceutical firms (Robbins-Roth, 2000). Hence linkages to these types of actors are regarded as 
crucial to become a successful company. This fits very well with the popular notion that modern 
innovation is developed in an interactive play between Science, Industry and Public Policies (such 
as implementation of R&D programmes, public regulation, tax credit policies etc), as opposed to 
older innovation models that tended to focus on innovation as a linear process driven by either 
scientific discoveries or by market demand (see for instance Rothwell & Zegveld, 1985). 
 
Moreover, when reviewing the literature on the biotechnology industry and having conversations 
over time with biotechnology entrepreneurs, R&D-managers and business-insiders, two main 
characteristics of the biotechnology business have been persistent: The first characteristic is the 
network organization, not only within the single firm, but also at industry-level among its 
stakeholders, including venture capital firms, university labs, business organizations, public 
regulators, and big pharmaceutical firms. The second characteristic is the absence of long-term 
strategies owing to the fact that SBFs constantly renew and readjust their strategies according to 
changes in the context or environment of the firm. Together, these suggest a need for a more 
systematic way of interpreting how network structures are managed and developed in small SBFs.  
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I think it is fruitful to use an analogy of a patchwork picture to describe what a biotechnology firm 
is and how the constitutive forces of network structuring can be described.  According to the 
Random House Unabridged Dictionary, a patchwork is:   
1. Something made up of an incongruous variety of pieces or parts; hodgepodge: a patchwork 
of verse forms.  
2. Work made of pieces of cloth or leather of various colors or shapes sewed together, used 
esp. for covering quilts, cushions, etc. 
 
Both definitions of  patchwork suggest analogies with an SBF:  
 
1. A SBF is a type of firm that is embedded in number of networks and alliances of different 
form and character and with different types of actors. Their technologies and their mode of 
establishing networks make them very difficult to compare.  
2. The ways that the biotechnology firms engage with their different partners varies, but aims 
to be consistent with the division of labor negotiated between the partners to bring about 
new innovations in the biotechnology industry. 
   
Theoretically, this article draws upon social network theories and a dynamic view of network 
relations. (Gulati, 19xx). This is done in order to capture the nature of the relationships between 
different types of actors, but also to emphasize both the formal and informal nature of some of these 
relationships.  
 
The paper starts out by stating its methodological foundations. Thereafter, the theoretical 
positioning of the network approach will argue that multiple network relationships are at play.  It 
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shows that not only do these networks differ in structure and stability, but also rely heavily on the 
institutional and organizational origins so as to understand the complex and collaborative nature of 
the biotechnology environment. The positioning of the SBFs as the focal point of the analysis leads 
to a discussion of entrepreneurial business strategies in the biotechnology industry and of how these 
business strategies correlate with interorganizational relationships. The empirical evidence will be 
laid out in four cases representing each of the four suggested strategies. The conclusion discusses 
three implications: First, the theoretical contributions of the heterogeneity between the four 
partnering strategies; second, future directions in the research; third, the foreseen managerial 
challenges. 
 
3. Data collection and research method 
 
This paper emerges from a longitudinal case-study based on qualitative data on the co-evolution of 
strategies and networks in the Biotechnology Industry in the US and Denmark. From a total 
population of thirty-two small biotechnology firms, the study identified three different types of 
network-based strategies undertaken by the entrepreneurs in the industry: The project strategy, the 
incremental strategy and the vertical-integration strategy. After these first initial results, five of the 
thirty-two firms were investigated over a period of eight years to study how networks evolved over 
time and how they co-evolved with the development of the firms’ business strategies. In total, the 
empirical data consists of sixty-seven interviews with people from the biotechnological community 
in the San Francisco Bay Area, San Diego, Boston, New York City, Chicago, Research Triangle 
Park, North Carolina and Copenhagen, Denmark.  
 
Table 1: Geographic Distribution            Table 2: Institutional Background of        
of Interviews                                             Informants  
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Boston   7  Small Biotechnological Firms  52 
Chicago 10  Research Parks   3 
New York City  3    Universities (Licensing Offices)   7 
Research Triangle Park, NC  9  Public and regulatory bodies   6 
San Diego  4  Venture capital firms   6 
San Francisco Bay Area         17  
Copenhagen, Denmark 17  
 
The interviews were conducted in three different periods. The first series of interviews was held 
over a period of eight months in 1993-94. The second phase took place in late 1997 where only 
small biotechnological companies were visited. The third phase had taken place at the end of 2001 
where updating of the companies strategies was done through phone interviews in five SBFs. 
Looking closely at table 1 and table 2, the number of interviews exceeds the actual total number of 
interviews since some of the informants belong to more than one category. Empirical data further 
consists of written material, such as company presentations, annual reports, and corporate 
prospectuses. Moreover, my data consists of Federal and State R&D Programs in biotechnology, 
and reviews of industry-related biotechnology journals. 
 
The five SBFs were carefully selected because of their specific strategic approach and 
entrepreneurial strategies after first round of interviewing, therefore their strategies for interaction 
with their context were expected be very different from one another. However what became 
obvious in the second round of interview was that the company’s entrepreneurial strategy (see later) 
changed all the time depending on its ability to get access to network partners through which they 
could mobilize scarce resources (money, knowledge, legitimacy) to further develop. Therefore, in 
my view, the four proposed strategies are mediating strategies that serve as blueprints for 
management of how SBFs, at specific points in time, overcome critical incidents. To illustrate this 
observation, I have chosen to investigate Calgene twice in this article  
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Figure 1: The nature of the roles of actors in the proposed strategies  
 
 
 
Industry 
(I) 
 
            
                                                Academia                                  Public        
        (A)                                     Authorities 
                                                                                                       (P) 
 
 
Research Oriented strategy:   I - A - p                             Incubator Strategy:      I - A - I- P 
Industrial partnering Strategy:  (I - I – I …n ) - a - p       Policy Oriented strategy: I - P – P - a 
 
 
It is important to emphasize that the three types of actor-groups have a much more complicated 
institutional background than can be represented in figure 1. Therefore the most important actor- 
groups will be fleshed out in a later section. Also, the number of relationships with one actor group 
and the intensity of the relationships vary and shift over time. This is indicated by the use of small 
letters and capital letters in the figure. For instance, a firm that follows the incubator strategy is 
perceived to have defined its platform technology while still finding its relations to academia 
important. At the same time it is for them crucial to build networks with corporate partners to have 
their business model legitimised. In this strategy, too, the first initial step regarding regulatory 
policies is taken. 
 
4. Network characteristics – network types and network dynamics 
 
The literature on the Biotechnology Industry has primarily focused attention on the widespread 
formation of networks between the leading research institutions in the core biotechnology 
disciplines, such as molecular biology, and both small and large biotechnology firms (Kenney, 
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1986; Kreiner & Schultz, 1993; Darby & Zucker, 1995; Powell et al, 1998; Robbins-Roth, 2000). 
The argument for the strong ties between academia and industry is based on three empirical 
assumptions: First, the basic scientific knowledge in biotechnology stems from universities or 
related institutions; second, the vast majority of the new biotechnology ventures have strong 
antecedents in university settings; third, small biotechnology firms have to get access to the new 
knowledge in their area to develop new biotechnology products and services.  
 
There are very good reasons why the formation of networks has either been assumed to be the way 
small biotechnology firms stay competitive with large and more resourceful firms, or as a way for 
small firms to enter into well-established markets when only possessing few internal resources. 
Thus networks have been seen as a means of accomplishing goals that otherwise would have been 
impossible. I will not argue against this, but point to the importance of investigating how particular 
networks are established and why the partners have engaged in these networks knowing that there 
are other partners out there. From my research in the biotechnology business, the SBFs have a less 
romantic view, one which raises questions about how the search process for new partners is 
organized. How do network partners meet and how has the collaboration developed over time? 
What characterizes a successful network relationship and what are the consequences of early 
termination of relationships?  
Management theory has drawn on sociological and anthropological research-traditions in taking a 
social-network perspective of organizations’ establishment of collaborative relations with different 
partners. In the same way that the socialization of human beings is a system of different types of 
personal networks of varying character and stability, it is taken for granted that firms also survive 
through different types of networks. The network-studies vary from being predominantly interested 
in interorganizational networks to focusing on how personal relations evolve in e.g. professional 
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groups in understanding the mechanism of how firms engage in external relations (Constant II, 
1984; 1987; Kreiner & Schultz, 1993; Kristensen; 1995). These two approaches introduce the 
problem of formal versus informal networks. The network metaphor captures, therefore, some 
important characteristics concerning the relations between a firm and its stakeholders such as 
customers, suppliers, knowledge institutions, financial investors, policy-making institutions etc.  
 
Constant conceives technologies as social arenas, so-called communities of practice. Communities 
are viewed as carriers of the body of knowledge that encompasses the technology in question 
(Constant II. 1984; 1987). Within communities of practice, conflicts emerge concerning the 
importance of different underlying techniques. The implication of this is that communities of 
practice consist of one or more technical representatives that promote different design 
configurations that appear around  a certain technology. The concept of communities of practice 
makes it possible to capture a dynamic pattern in the way in which new technologies are developed 
and formed by gaining insight into the work, the methodologies, the patterns of communication and 
the career paths of the key researchers in the specific technologies in question. For the purposes of 
this article, the concept of communities of practice allows the observer to dissolve the 
organizational boundaries between industry and academia and look at the informal relationships in a 
professional arena or research area that foster the basic knowledge behind the technologies in 
question. This is important for studying biotechnology firms, because biotechnology as a concept 
consists of a number of subsystems that are represented by the different professional/technical 
approaches that the firms in question have chosen to follow. These approaches and methodologies 
are reflected in the networks the firms form and engage in, and in the relationships that the 
professional groups (communities of practice) participate in. 
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Another way of making the network perspective a dynamic one is to follow specific networks that 
the firms have developed over time rather than following the actors and stakeholders in the firm. It 
is my hypothesis that the majority of the networks start out as very loose contacts, where partners 
have the opportunity to try out the partnership before it is formalized, or terminated. Other networks 
are, by nature, informal and temporary, making them very difficult to depict and investigate without 
following the individual actors. An example that illustrates this point is when an employee seeks 
new knowledge in his personal network to sort out ideas that otherwise would have been dead-ends 
in the development work, saving the SBF time and money. From an analytical point of view, this 
informal networking knowledge that is transferred within a few minutes and may never be used 
again, but can be crucial to understand how problem-solving takes place in a SBF. To maintain the 
distinction between formal and informal, it is therefore important to separate informal networks 
from the formalized network-activities and seek to localize where in the organization the different 
networks appear and originate. At the same time it is important to find out how communication is 
organized internally, and how it flows, since the presented theories all point to the fact that 
communication patterns determine the rate and direction of the established networks and the 
establishment of future network relations.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Network typology 
 
 Internal External 
 
 
 
 
 
Formal 
Communication/flows of 
information 
 
- Nature of hierarchy 
- Subsidiary – headquarter 
- Unit - Group 
Formalized contracts 
- Strategic alliances 
- Joint Ventures 
- Outsourcing arrangements 
- Licensing agreements 
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- Superior – subordinate 
 
 
 
 
Informal 
Personal  based 
- Sub-unit - division 
- Sub-unit – sub-group 
- Person to person 
Trust based 
- R&D collaboration 
- Internal jobmarkets 
- Person to person 
- Communities of  practice 
 
Figure 2 classifies networks and locates them according to their organizational and institutional 
origin. The bold italized headings in each of the columns indicate the overall trait or characteristics 
of the network relationships. 
 
The typology is important for several reasons: First, it can be used to investigate how networks 
evolve over time. This is important in order to explain how the formalization of distinct types of 
networks happens over time and whether distinct types of networks can be categorized and/or 
identified as specific activities of strategic importance. Second, the typology can be used to analyse 
how networks are formed between different types of professions. For example, do networks that are 
established by management have a tendency to be more formal than networks that are established 
by the firm’s researchers?  In other words, the network activities have to be followed by a question 
about how these networks have evolved and why these networks have taken a specific form and 
character 
Methodologically, and from the point of the typology, it is important to keep the distinctions in a 
relative pure form because it enables us to investigate the origin of these network relations and to 
research how these networks are created and how they develop over time. The strength of the figure 
is that it, on the one hand, seeks to classify different forms and types of networks and, at the same 
time, also reveals the differences. This makes it possible to illustrate that there might be a dynamic 
movement between the different types of networks. Looking at the left side of table, it is important 
to emphasize that the ability to form networks is limited by the internal organization and the way 
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that the internal communication is organized. The reason the internal networks have been included 
is due to the widespread idea in organizational sociology that the more hierarchical and formalized 
the procedures are structured in an organization, the more difficulty the members of the 
organization will have in developing intraorganizational networks on their own. Moreover, a strict 
hierarchical structure will make it difficult for individuals to mobilize resources through their 
personal network, for example in a community of practice, and there would also be limited 
possibilities to establish new personal networks. In both situations it will be impossible for the 
organization to utilize such types of network experiences or “free resources” in the development of 
the company; it will also restrict the firm’s employees from developing a personal network because 
they do not have any knowledge to exchange in the networks. The figure lists four forms of formal 
and external network activities. Those networks are typically characterized as being contractual by 
nature. In a strategic alliance, the biotechnology firm receives revenues or payment to develop a 
specific product or project for a larger firm. With the establishment of a joint venture, two or more 
firms develop a subsidiary firm and this has been one of the major forms of network activities that 
have appeared in the biotechnology industry. Joint venturing has also been one of the collaborative 
arrangements where universities have been able to profit from their investments in basic research 
activities by engaging in setting up new businesses. Third, outsourcing has become another 
formalized network activity that is widespread among the SBFs. The firms outsource activities for 
which they either do not have the competencies or the interest in taking care of themselves, such as 
the production of cabinets for special devices or components, or activities such as production, 
marketing and distribution. Fourth, licensing agreements imply that the small biotechnology firm 
leaves the production rights and the distribution of a product in return for a royalty fee.  However 
the most common licensing agreement is when a firm or an institution patents a technique that they 
license out to partnering companies.  
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Both the informal and external networks are predominantly connected with research and 
development activities. These networks are most often formed within communities of practice and 
are guided by trust-based relations. They are also characterized as personal, implying that these 
networks, from the perspective of the organization, are not directly accessible but are, for instance, 
formed between former classmates or key personnel from prior jobs (Norus, 1997). The personal 
relations or communities of practice also function as internal job markets. It is through these 
information channels that job opportunities are exchanged, which is of crucial importance for 
individuals that are employed in organizations that develop new technologies because of the 
insecurity concerning the viability of the technology in question. The insecurity of the technologies 
forces the employees to engage in communities of practice to form connections that can be used to 
get a new job if the firm goes down. The risk in being excluded from the network, combined with 
importance of belonging to such a network, diminishes the tendency to opportunism. If excluded, an 
employee is relegated from having access to useful knowledge in his/her present job and will not 
get any of the attractive job opportunities that are exchanged within a community of practice. 
 
5. The nature of the environment 
One way that SBFs signal attractiveness is by revealing both their formal and informal partnerships 
and networks with research institutions, universities, venture capital groups, pharmaceutical firms 
and other related businesses. The point here is that network formation is an essential activity for 
survival with much wider impact than just being a means of mobilizing knowledge and financial 
resources. For these firms, it is a never-ending story because it is crucial to have access to the most 
prestigious networks to legitimize the firm’s present activities and thus to further mobilize resources 
for the future activities. Therefore, as emphasized when introducing the patchwork metaphor, 
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network activities are to be conceived as series of non-sequential decision- making processes that 
have to be made at different stages throughout the corporate life-cycle.  
 
Although this article’s aim is to have a closer look at the relations between entrepreneurs, academia 
and public and regulatory bodies, it is very hard not to acknowledge that other types of important 
actors intervene in this power triangle and play important roles as intermediate actors. Therefore 
these other types of actors are included in the overall description of the biotechnology community.  
However, apart from the technology parks, both the role of venture capital and the pharmaceutical 
firms will be almost absent from the analysis in the cases presented. 
In the field of Biotechnology, six major actors and actor groups have been playing a dominating 
role in forming the new industry.  
 
1. Small biotechnology firms that apply new biotechnological techniques to develop 
commercial products, projects, and services 
2. Universities with strong research capabilities in new biotechnologies 
3. Research or technology parks that function as incubators for small biotechnology firms 
4. Public and regulatory bodies that have implemented biotechnology R&D programs in order 
to promote the biotechnology industry as well as institutions that regulate the biotechnology 
industry by initiating approval procedures and procedures for environmental protection 
5. Venture capital firms that have financed the start up of many biotechnology firms 
6. Pharmaceutical firms that overwhelmingly engage in the late-stage funding of the SBFs 
through buy-ups and strategic alliance making. 
 
Figure 3. The interactive nature of the biotechnology community 
 15
Biotechno-
logical firms
Venture capital
firms
Universities
Technology
parks
Public and regu-
latory bodies
Pharmaceutical
firms
 
 
Figure 3 shows the interaction that takes place among small biotechnology firms in relation to the 
formation of networks with key actors. However, in the figure all actors appear to be equal at all 
times which is not the case. Instead I think it is fruitful to think of the six types of actors as 
necessary partners with whom future relationships are to be established.  
 
6. Entrepreneurial strategies in biotechnology firms 
 
The biotechnological industry has been formed and developed predominantly by small 
biotechnological firms with very strong roots and antecedents in scientific environments (Powell, 
1994; 1996; 1998; Dodgson, 1993; McKelvey, 1996; Kenney, 1986, Robbins-Roth, 1999; Norus, 
2002). Although they have been able to develop quite sophisticated technological projects and 
products, the small biotechnological firms (SBFs) only have a few employees. These technological 
projects are developed through a wide range of collaborative arrangements, such as informal 
networks (research collaboration, resource sharing etc.) and formalized networks (joint ventures, 
licensing agreements and strategic alliances) with a variety of partners (venture capital firms, 
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pharmaceutical and chemical firms, public and regulatory bodies, other small biotechnology firms, 
universities and research parks). This means that having a variety of different network arrangements 
is to be regarded as a means of survival in a new technological field where we would expect that 
only large multinational companies, with large financial and human resources, have the 
competencies and capabilities to direct and control the evolution of the technology in question. 
 
It is beyond doubt that some of small biotechnology firms are established with the ambition of 
expanding activities into a company that can develop, produce and market new biotechnology-
based products. Therefore it is not surprising that Peter Daly, in his 1985 book on the industry, The 
Biotechnology Business, is preoccupied with business strategies based on different aspects of how 
small biotechnology firms have aimed at being vertically-integrated companies. At that time, 
biotechnology had had its first boom on the stock market, and the firms in question therefore had 
sufficient financial resources to reach this goal. When investors and entrepreneurs realized the 
problems of scaling up the processes from an experimental stage to have cost effective, full-scale 
production plants, the vertical ambition came to an end.  Small biotechnology firms were needed to 
develop mediating strategies with explicit exit strategies that were adaptable to the turbulent 
environment and flexible enough for the changes among the dominating actors in the biotechnology 
industry. The problem is that entrepreneurs often have neither the aspirations nor the resources to 
develop, manufacture, market and distribute new biotechnology products. Their major interest is in 
developing the science and the technology and they sell promising R&D projects in order to create 
space for the development of their biotechnological competencies. A population-ecology approach 
would tend to conclude that small biotechnology firms have had no impact on the development of 
the new biotechnology industry. Alternatively, such an approach would lead to the erroneous 
conclusion that new biotechnological techniques have no commercial interest since the developers, 
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the small firms, have failed to market any new products. Instead companies that aspire to becoming 
vertically integrated do not have the necessary resources and must therefore engage in strategic 
alliances and licensing agreements, or they will eventually be bought up.  
 
For analytical reasons, it is important to distinguish between different types of biotechnology firms 
and different types of strategies that have developed over time for fulfilling the aspirations of the 
individual entrepreneurial firm. Therefore, it is fruitful to think of the biotechnology firm as a 
portfolio of related development projects in different chronological order. The project analogy is in 
accordance with the strategies pursued by the biotechnology firms in my population. Because of the 
different character and combination of the collaborative arrangements undertaken by the SBFs, it 
would be a flaw to search for an ideal strategy pursued by small biotechnological firms. A single 
best strategy in this area does not exist. Instead the search for best strategy has to be determined by 
the technological approach of the company, the aspirations of the entrepreneurs, and their modes of 
doing business through the organization and establishment of external networks. Three types of 
strategies undertaken by the SBFs will be outlined: the project strategy, the incremental strategy, 
and the vertical integration strategy.  
In relation to the “project strategy” the SBF tries to develop a market for a portfolio of related R&D 
projects, which the SBFs have carried out. This strategy can best be described as characterizing the 
SBF as a “science boutique” where the distinct aim is to sell or license projects to large 
pharmaceutical or chemical companies in a continuous stream. Hence, the science in itself is a 
product.  
 
The firms following the “incremental strategy” have a slightly different strategic approach where 
the SBF gradually learns about and gains experience of the nature of the different task. The aim is  
 18
to take command incrementally over more and more activities and, by doing so, fulfill the long-term 
goals of the company. The backbone of this strategy is to generate resources by selling projects, 
offering consulting services and by establishing joint ventures with larger firms. Through these 
partnerships, the SBF gradually builds up more and more competencies in-house while, at the same 
time, they protect what are considered the long-term assets of the company.  
 
The SBFs that follow the “vertical integration strategy” have a much more comprehensible strategy 
in the sense that the idea is to become a vertically integrated company that takes care of all 
functions from the development of new products, to the production, sales, marketing and 
distribution. Only a few SBFs follow the vertical-integration strategy due to the complexity of the 
technology, the regulatory aspects of getting a product approved, and of course the lack of resources 
to achieve the long term goal. Another important reason is that small firms often face competence 
gaps and cannot build up fast enough an organization that can handle all aspects from research, 
production, marketing, regulatory aspects and distribution to capitalize on patents with a limited 
duration. This strategy means that the firm has to become a publicly traded company through an 
initial public offering (IPO) that challenges the routines for strategy formation, management and 
establishment of external networks. 
 
7. Linking entrepreneurial strategies with the four mediating strategies 
 
To investigate the dynamic aspects of network formation over time, the case analysis has to come to 
grips with the different types of decisions that are made at different points in time. An important 
analytical tool is the phase model that is outlined in figure 4. The phase model emphasizes the 
strategic options according to the different tasks and functions the small biotechnology firms carry 
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out with different types of network partners. The figure links the four different network strategies 
and puts them into chronological order. The steps from development to marketing express only 
some of the important steps on the ways to launch a product. The figure does not attempt to impose 
a functional logic concerning the importance nor the intensity in the network over time, since this 
must be an empirical question. Although the four strategies are put into a chronological order, it is 
important to stress that it is a non-linear process where feedback loops between the functions 
happens owing to the trial-and-error nature of the network relationships. 
 
Figure 4: Linking actors to strategies 
The research-oriented strategy narrowly focuses on how a biotechnology firm transforms its 
research result into promising technologies, services or products. The incubator strategy is 
concerned with the problem of location and how to approach specific types of managerial problems 
in the initial stage of forming a business venture. The industrial partnering strategy has to do with 
how to overcome the problem of bringing the technologies from an experimental stage at a research 
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lab to be able handle industrial processes and full scale production. Last, but by no means least, the 
policy-oriented strategy focuses attention on the problem of needing to have products approved by 
the public authorities.  
 
The four strategies are not fixed, but mediating strategies, step-by-step processes that many 
biotechnology firms encounter when developing and commercializing their technologies. Hence the 
strategies depict and emphasize specific ways of dealing with strategic problems that are solved by 
building up interorganizational relations. The incubator strategy is concerned with the problem of 
location and how to approach specific types of managerial problem in the initial forming a business 
venture. The industrial partnering strategy has to do with how to overcome the problem of bringing 
the technologies from an experimental stage at a research lab to be able to handle industrial 
processes and full-scale production. Last, but by no means least, the policy-oriented strategy 
focuses attention on the problem of needing to have products approved by the public authorities.  
 
8. The research-oriented strategy (Calgene, part one) 
 
Calgene was founded in a garage in Davis, California as a company doing contract research. The 
fact that the firm started by doing contract research affected the way that Calgene sought to 
legitimize and organize its activities in later stages where it sought to control large market-segments 
of the tomato industry. It was doomed to fail and it failed. Until recently it was possible to 
download from Calgene’s homepage the titles of all the scientific publications that the employees 
published in scientific journals in the period from 1981-1996, in total two hundred and forty-seven 
published articles. It is interesting to look at the distribution of the research papers over the years. In 
1981 and 1982 only one paper was published each year. Then the number of published articles rose 
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to thirty articles per year in the period from 1985-1989. The number of articles that the Calgene 
researchers published then dropped to ten to fifteen articles in the period from 1989-96.1  
 
The publication profile reflects that no professional community had been established in the area of 
genetic engineering in plant research when the firm started. There was an absence of available 
techniques that were used to identify and characterize the specific genes in the plants, and the area 
also lacked scientific models on genetically modified plants. Therefore, both a research community 
and the research field needed to be established and the only way to establish such communities was 
to establish the field through extensive contacts within the scientific environments in plant research. 
Thus, there was a hidden logic behind the corporate publication profile. First, the single researcher 
or a research firm has to demonstrate that they have developed research results that are of interest to 
the scientific communities in question. This ability is demonstrated through scientific publication. 
Secondly, publication is the ticket to be invited to meetings and conferences where the firm can 
present its research and the prospects of their business. It is in these meetings and conferences that 
new technological fields can be introduced and initiated.  
 
Before a firm has relevant results to publish, it has to build up a common knowledge base of the 
firm. This period equals the first couple of years when Calgene only published a few scientific 
papers. Afterwards there is a phase where the new scientific field is established, a period where the 
results from the research begin to show up on a regular basis, which corresponds to the phase from 
1985-1988. In the third phase there are as many results published as in the second phase, but now 
the field is established and the commercial perspectives becomes visible and the firm becomes more 
product-oriented. In this phase, the firm has to be careful not to make public too many articles that 
                                                 
1 The homepage that was closed in the year  2000 and was originally found at:  (http//:www.calgene-com.htm). 
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can reveal confidential development areas. This is seen in the period from 1989-1996 where the 
number of articles published by Calgene researchers decreased. Another interesting detail 
concerning the period from 1992-1996 is that the articles published are primarily concerned with 
the applications and the commercial perspectives of the new techniques. This shows that the small 
biotechnology firms do corporate research and present in both academic and business oriented 
settings as a means of attracting industrial partners. In Calgene, the research activities served a dual 
purpose: The firm developed the basic scientific knowledge in a specific area and the firm 
commercialized its research. The firm could only fulfill the last objective because the corporate 
researchers had the specific knowledge concerning the technological performance characteristics 
and hands-on knowledge in both the basic research and the commercialization of the technologies. 
 
Calgene gained status both as a reliable business partner and as a serious partner in the 
establishment of research contracts by smoothing the lines between given presentations to a 
research community and given presentations of commercial nature. This routine was deeply rooted 
and meant that Calgene researchers had the main responsibility of attracting resources through 
research contracts and making partnerships with the industry to cover the expenses for their 
research projects. Thus the researchers were given the ability to succeed in two worlds: The 
research world, with the development of a research field or a community of practitioners of genetic 
engineering in plants, and the business world, where the Calgene researchers aimed to establish 
contacts with industry to convince them that they should engage in strategic alliances and pay 
Calgene to do the research. 
 
Despite the divisionalization of the corporate activities, the firm continued to establish research 
contracts using the same channels as the firm did when it was a research boutique. Each individual 
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division, of course, made the contracts, but it was still the researchers that were in charge. This 
meant that Calgene continued its mode of engaging in strategic alliances with large firms. 
Therefore, Calgene established alliances with firms such as Campbell Soup regarding the Flavr 
Savr™ tomato, Procter & Gamble in developing oils for detergents, Mobil Oil regarding motor oil, 
and Rhone Poulenc Agrochemie regarding the development of cottonseeds. All these contracts were 
initiated through personal contacts with key personnel in the different divisions. As Calgene became 
more well-known in these firms, people from large firms came to visit the Calgene headquarter in 
Davis and shopped around in the different laboratories to search for interesting projects.  
 
The interesting aspect of the research-oriented strategy in a network perspective is that the nature of 
the relationships that the company is developing is very much biased and guided by values that can 
be found in academia. It seems like all external relationships are to be developed from informal and 
trust-based relations, where the partnering model is based on a vision of going on a life-long 
journey with the partner. The way that the concept of trust is interpreted and taken for granted in 
these relationships means that the company, after establishing its technological platform, continues 
to develop its industrial partnering-strategy in the same way. When the company change its overall 
strategy from being a contract research-based company to become a vertically integrated tomato 
company, the firm probably will have great difficulties in establishing network relations that are not 
guided by scientific values. When we turn to the policy-oriented strategy we will see that Calgene 
established relations to the FDA (the Federal Food and Drug Administration) the exact same way. 
 
9. The incubator strategy, ThermoGen 
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In 1988 David Demirjian Founded ThermoGen Inc. together with his former professor from the 
University of Chicago, Malcolm Casadaban. The firm is located in Chicago, Illinois and until 1998 
it rented its facilities from the incubator in the Chicago Technology Park. During 1998, the firm 
moved out of the incubator and rented new buildings in the Chicago Technology Park only a few 
blocks from its prior location. This move from the incubator both qualitatively and quantitatively 
led to changes both from a strategic and an organizational point of view. The firm’s technological 
platform was developed from a specific type of enzymes and proteins, thermophilic organisms that 
are used as biocatalysts. The biocatalysts, the enzymes, can be used in industrial processes, for 
example in the development of foodstuffs, chemical products and pharmaceutical products. 
Compared with traditional industrial enzymes, thermophilic enzymes are more stabile and can 
function in high temperatures. Hence fermentation processes can be carried through much faster 
than is the case with existing techniques.  
 
The interviewees judged the role of the incubator in the Chicago Technology Park as not only 
economically crucial. The firm definitely would not have existed without the incubator. The access 
to up-to-date laboratory facilities in the initial phase would not have been possible to acquire for the 
USD 25,000 that was the company’s seed money. Also the business knowledge and different types 
of consultancy services that the incubator provided in its initial stage could not have been bought 
outside the incubator.  
 
For the members of the research team, the Chicago Technology Park was not an immediate find 
when they searched for facilities. They tried to locate in the incubator of the University of Evanston, 
but this incubator was not prepared for biotechnology firms. Afterwards the researchers tried to hire 
laboratory facilities at the University of Chicago. Thereafter they became aware of the Chicago 
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Technology Park and were surprised at the capacity of the incubator. First of all there, were 
experienced entrepreneurs present from whom the researchers got valuable information. Some of 
these firms had also bought quite sophisticated equipment that ThermoGen could borrow and that 
helped to lower the costs.  
 
Surprisingly, the access to these networks influenced the way in which ThermoGen structured and 
organized its activities. For instance, the firms developed a flexible collaborative system, a sort of 
social security system that meant that the firms could internally hire and lend out human resources 
in periods with ups and downs. In that way, a sort of internal fence against bad times was 
established, this made it possible to keep jobs for the people that the companies had hired. At the 
same time, this collaborative system meant that all the firms did not necessarily need to acquire all 
laboratory facilities. For ThermoGen the collaborative system meant that the firm could stay 
independent of external financial investment for a longer period of time. In bad times, the internal 
security system was an advantage owing to the collaborative nature of the neighboring firms. In 
good times it was an advantage because of the possibility of hiring human resources from other 
firms, and borrowing laboratories and equipment from firms facing troubles.  
 
Taking a network perspective on the initial phase of the history of ThermoGen, it is characteristic 
that a number of mediating actors (persons and institutions) are mobilized to find new partners and 
people that could further assist the business process. All these people have been very closely related 
to the company’s location in the incubator. The mobilization of actors and institutions has been 
crucial in helping ThermoGen overcome the problem of bringing the firm from a basic research unit 
to an entrepreneurial business seeking to develop its own products and services. It is my 
interpretation that many small biotechnology firms die out in the process of defining the business 
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because they fail to get access to these mediating actors. Their search processes lead to dead-ends 
that do not allow the small firms to develop a precise business plan and a corporate vision. In the 
case of ThermoGen, all necessary contacts to lawyers, accountants etc. were initiated and organized 
through the Chicago Technology Park.  
 
9. The industrial partnering strategy, incyte genomics 
 
Incyte Genomics was founded in 1991 under the corporate name Incyte Pharmaceuticals. Incyte 
Genomics has specialized in design, development and marketing of database information products 
in the characterization and identification of genes and these genes’ protein structure. This 
information is used by large pharmaceutical firms in the development of new types of drugs. The 
information products are also used in the development of genetically modified plants, where it is 
used to isolate specific genes. Incyte has stock copies of a huge number of gene sequences that they 
supply to their partners on demand, making it is possible for the customers to develop new 
products. Incyte sells their “products” by engaging in partnerships with pharmaceutical firms who 
access the database with non-exclusive rights. Incyte has also developed a range of applications for 
the database that allow customers to search for active substances to develop new drugs. For large 
industrial partners, there is a twenty-four-hour access to the database systems, whereas Incyte 
serves the smaller partner by providing in-house consultancy service.  
 
The company’s primary income comes from partnership fees and from consultancy services for 
small firms that do not have the interest in or the resources for an exclusive access to the database. 
These firms ask Incyte to take care of search processes. The partnership arrangement is created so 
that Incyte will have royalties from products that its partners have developed by subscribing to their 
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sequencing systems. The first two partnerships that Incyte established were the agreements with 
Pfizer and Pharmacia & Upjohn. These two firms got stock options as part of their agreements; thus 
these two firms in 1998 owned 6.7% and 7.5% respectively of the corporate stocks before the stock 
issue in 1997. In spite of the fact that these two firms have ownership in Incyte, all partnership 
agreements with other firms are established with non-exclusive rights so that Incyte has no special 
ties to any of its customers. None of the partners can say that they have special advantages or 
disadvantages compared to the other partners. Another reason that access to the databases is given 
on a non-exclusive basis is to avoid letting one of the major partners buy up the firm to keep the 
technology for itself. This aspect of the agreements  may be the primary reason that the first two 
partners took an equity position, because they may have feared that they could have been used as a 
sales window to sell off the company afterwards, without having had an opportunity to make an 
offer on the firm themselves.  
 
Incyte Genomics engages in two types of partnership agreements with firms: 1) Firms that buy 
access to the databases, and 2) firms that deliver or sell data to the databases. The latter type of 
agreement is Incyte’s strategy to form partnerships with as many relevant firms as possible and 
have them to deliver the data that Incyte afterwards structures and packs into the databases. These 
partnerships concern the input to the database or bioinformations systems. These information 
systems are later indexed in interests groups such as animals, plants, bacteria etc. 
 
Consistent with the experiences faced by the firms in my sample,  Incyte did find that, as a firm 
legitimizes its technologies, there is no longer a question of how to attract new partners; rather, 
interested partners contact the firm to form partnerships or ask for their consultancy services. In this 
situation, the firm faces a need to make continuous evaluations and reviews of technologies and 
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techniques developed by small biotechnology firms that could be interesting to include into the 
databases. This very fact changes the way that the firm organizes its external relations. Previously, 
Incyte often attended research conferences to promote the firm and present the services that it could 
provide. Today the promotional work is much more focused around the development of new 
partnerships. 
 
A third type of partnership that was developed in 1997 was a joint partnership with the 
pharmaceutical firm, SmithKline Beecham, in the formation of a joint venture firm, diaDexus, that 
develops molecular diagnostic products. The firm is located in Santa Clara, 10 miles south of Palo 
Alto. The agreement between SmithKline Beecham and Incyte is that the larger partner gives 
diaDexus an exclusive license to utilize a range of diagnostic tests, the rights to which  SmithKline 
Beecham had bought from a third biotechnology firm, Human Genome Science, whereas Incyte 
provides access to the firm’s bioinformation systems on a non-exclusive basis. The partnership 
should reduce the risk of failure because each of the firms adds some very scarce competencies. 
Incyte adds some very important support functions, whereas SmithKline Beecham has the 
competencies that make it possible to have the diagnostic products approved and marketed.  
 
From a network perspective, it seems like the industrial-partnering strategy is an almost endless 
opportunity-seeking formula for developing a small biotechnology venture. That said, it is also fair 
to say that the strategy is not very easily copied or transferred into other types of biotechnology 
firms. Bioinformatics and genomics firms have a technological platform that allows them to act as a 
highly advanced service company and, at the same time, take out specific projects and develop them 
into new business ventures, for example, joint venturing in collaboration with their large industrial 
partners. This means fast growth both in terms of employees and in the numbers of partners. In turn, 
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this raises questions about a company’s ability to manage this growth since there must be an upper 
limit to how many partnerships you can be committed to at same time.  
 
10. The policy-oriented strategy, Calgene, part two 
 
In the late 1980s, Calgene decided to develop its own products instead of continuing to be a 
research boutique; this decision meant that the firm started new activities to be well prepared for the 
happy day when the Federal Drug Administration (FDA) would approve the new products.  
The FDA is seen as either the worst nightmare of a bureaucratic organization or as a relatively open 
organization. In principle, the FDA is performing an impossible task because it is unable to develop 
the competencies and skills necessary to keep up with the development of new products and 
technologies in the industry. In consequence, getting biotechnological products approved is 
considerably more time-consuming than getting traditional products approved. This causes 
difficulties for the companies because they are almost set on hold while waiting for the FDA 
approval. Therefore, small biotechnology firms in general must display a more proactive attitude 
toward the FDA while the clinical trials are going on instead of sitting back and waiting for the 
FDA decision. One example of the negative attitude toward the FDA appeared during the interview 
below with Dr. David Englemann, a Stanford professor who has formed four biotechnology 
ventures; in contrast, Carolyn Hayworth, in the excerpt which follows, speaks positively of the 
policy strategy followed by Calgene when having the genetically modified tomato approved.  
 
I hate the FDA. The FDA is a barrier to entry. The FDA exists to prevent potentially toxic drugs 
or toxic or dangerous devices from getting to market. The FDA doesn’t get any credit if a 
marvelous new drug is discovered and approved. But they get blamed if a marvelous new drug is 
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approved and it turns out to have unanticipated toxicity. For that reason the FDA’s sole purpose 
for existing is to prevent drugs and devices for getting approved because they only get blamed if 
something goes wrong. They don’t get any credit if things go right. It takes ten years on average 
for a drug or device to be approved and it cost hundreds of millions of dollars. I see it as a 
negative incentive for the small company. It is one of the reasons why so few drugs are approved 
every year - because the FDA makes it so difficult. I think that the companies themselves should 
be responsible for assuring the safety of the drugs and the efficacy to the maximum of extent 
possible. But I believe in letting the market forces determine that. I think that there have to be 
some basic safety rules but the kind of testing that is required of the FDA, I don’t agree with it. I 
think it is overkill.  
Dr. David Englemann, Director of the Stanford Blood Center 
 
We have an excellent relationship with the FDA right now. Not that they have given us 
anything as quickly as we wanted, but part of the development of this technology was that we 
wanted to be the first. We wanted to be the pioneer in this technology and get through the FDA 
and help the FDA to form the policies for these types of products, and that is what we have done. 
In 1992, the FDA, after we had presented our data, developed a policy for the development of 
new plant varieties and they included genetic engineering. Calgene has been instrumental and 
helped them to put together that policy. We had wanted to demonstrate the effectiveness to 
validate that the government has oversight in this area, and that their oversight is appropriate, 
and that is what we have done. They are validating our products as much as we are validating 
their agency in the area of biotechnology. So it is a kind of I help you, and you help me.  
Carolyn Hayworth, Manager of The PR Department, Calgene 
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As indicated Calgene, at a very early point (by the end of 1988), formed its initial productive 
relationships with the FDA. The strategy was to get actively involved in the specifications of the 
rules and regulations that the FDA would demand of genetically modified food products. At that 
time the FDA had not developed a set of rules and regulations in this area because no companies 
had contacted the FDA to have such products approved. Therefore, Calgene was the first company 
that called for rules and regulations. This implied that Calgene, by its own account, established a 
very open dialogue with the FDA, and that Calgene assisted the FDA in the development of the 
policy that the FDA published in 1992. This policy was made public two years after Calgene had 
posted its first application for product approval of the Flavr Savr™ tomato to the FDA. This first 
application was renewed in 1991 and forced the FDA to carry out a policy and a set of rules and 
procedures aimed at the genetically modified food products that began to show up in 1991.  
 
The approvals of the product took more time than expected. Eventually Calgene got the tomato 
approved in the beginning of May 1994 and Flavr Savr™ was the first genetically modified fresh 
fruit or vegetable product that was approved for human consumption by the FDA. The final 
approval was very positive from the perspective of Calgene because the FDA evaluation of the 
product concluded that the Flavr Savr™ tomato did not differ noticeably from traditional tomatoes 
on a number of characteristics. Therefore Calgene was not forced to put a special sticker on the 
tomatoes showing that the product was genetically modified. The selling of the tomatoes began 
three days after the approval in supermarkets in Illinois and Northern California. The sales figures 
were positive, but Calgene did not earn any money because it did not have access to enough square 
acres to grow the tomatoes, and therefore the firm could not supply the supermarket/customers with 
a stabile delivery and a sufficient quantity of the new tomatoes.  
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When the FDA had approved Flavr Savr™ in the beginning of May 1994, Calgene was prepared 
both internally and externally to take advantage of its rights to sell the product on the market. 
Despite the fact that the FDA did not find that the product differed from other tomatoes available on 
the market, Calgene changed the brandname of the tomato. Instead of the well-known name from 
the media, Flavr Savr™, the tomato was given a more neutral and ‘agricultural’  name: 
“MacGregor®.” According to Martineau, the name alluded to the children’s song “Old MacDonald 
had a farm” (Martineau, 2001). 
Part II of the Calgene case shows how the company still uses the same gameplan for building up 
relationships when approaching the FDA for the final product approval. In Belinda Martineau’s 
book, “First Fruit”, she describes how it was the senior researchers at Calgene that were given the 
task first of having their technological concept approved; it was the same group of researchers that 
eventually put together the final application and had the tomato approved, while the business- 
development people and the chief regulatory personal were given the task of promoting the first 
genetically modified fruit for human consumption in different forums, such as consumer rights 
groups, supermarkets etc. (Martineau, 2001)  
 
11. Conclusion 
 
This article shows that the initial networks that the companies form create paths for the future 
ability to form new partnerships. Therefore it could be interesting to investigate the path-dependent 
nature of strategies and try to link strategic analysis in a single firm with the ongoing research 
discussions on path-dependence and path-creation in the area of economics, economic sociology 
and technology sociology (Garud & Karnøe, 2001; Rosenberg, 1994). Such a discussion will point 
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to the very interesting dilemmas that managements face when creating new strategies. Another way 
to interpret the outcome of this paper is to view the entrepreneurial strategies as the top-
management’s vision aimed at the firm’s stakeholders such as venture capital and other business 
partners, and look at the proposed strategies as operational strategies in order for the organization to 
have a strategic road map or milestones to see how progress is made.  
 
This discussion points to several possible implications for business people, policymakers and 
academia. For business people, particularly those considering starting their own business, it 
seems to be of vital importance for entrepreneurs to face the challenges of how norms and values 
among the key personal are able to point the direction for how to engage in external partnerships. 
To the extent that we can argue that organizational routines are under construction in this stage 
of corporate life, the article demonstrates how valuable resources are mobilized in a variety of 
different external networks. However, how to establish network relations can be difficult in the 
later stages of corporate life if the new network is guided by a different set of values and norms. 
This is because networks often are of an exclusive nature, calling for strong relationship-building 
activities, management of reputation, etc.  
 
For policymakers, the often rather blinkered focus on solitary entrepreneurs, and how to pick 
these winners and nurture them, may need to be replaced with a stronger focus on the importance 
of solidarity networks and the process of trust-building among entrepreneurs. Skills for business 
start-ups are available in network contexts and their importance for generating more business 
start-ups are presently underestimated in most industry policies we know of. 
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Finally, for academia it is necessary not only to acknowledge that networks are important in the 
processes of firm creation, but also to understand what they actually are able to take care of in 
business-creation processes. A stronger focus on the role of the systemic nature of business-creation 
processes is called for, in order to explore the division of labor actually taking place in the 
microcosm of business creation. 
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